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Abstract 
The DoD’s evolutionary acquisition policy is directed against project risk, but bears 
inherent risks of its own. The DoD policy for evolutionary acquisition mandates multiple product 
releases via spiral (i.e., amorphous & unplanned) or incremental (i.e., defined & deferred) 
development methodologies for all programs. All amorphous spirals eventually become 
definitive increments. Incremental development entails the deliberate deferral of work to a 
subsequent phase. Computational organizational modeling using systems dynamics reveals 
that this methodology introduces more concurrency during development, and more variety in 
production. The result is earlier delivery of the first increment, but with later and more costly 
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delivery of subsequent increments than if conducted via a single-step methodology. 
Curtailments of scope by the exclusive use of mature technology enable more effective delivery 
of the first increment, further illustrated by two case studies. Duplication, rework, transaction 
costs, decision backlog and error are causes of inefficiency in the successive increments. 
Production variety and mixed configurations produce obvious implications for logistical 
supportability, training, failure causality, compatibility and interoperability, etc. Further, certain 
attributes of hardware products might help determine the suitability of this development 
methodology. Products that are nearly immutable, which have binary requirements for key 
capabilities, require man-rating, or are maintenance-intensive may not be good candidates for 
incremental development. Mutable products with costless production, continuous requirements, 
low maintenance, or time criticality are more likely to reap advantages from this development 
approach. While modular open systems architecture facilitates system adaptation, modularity 
itself does not necessarily create evolutionary advantages due to relative modular 
interdependency. Program managers must be aware of the inherent risks of these agile 
acquisition methods and take additional steps to balance them with appropriate planning and 
resources, disciplined change-control measures, organizational accommodations and 
accountability for configuration management. 
Keywords: Evolutionary acquisition, spiral development, incremental product 
development, Javelin, ATACMS, agile development methodologies, computational 
organizational modeling, modularity. 
Introduction—The Inevitability of Change 
We are told in Diogenes Laertius's Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (early 
3rd century) that the Greek philosopher Heraclitus (c.535 - 475 BC) was the first to observe and 
say, “Everything flows; nothing stands still,”—the popular derivation of which is, “The only 
constant is change.”  Indeed, everything does seem to change, evolve and give rise to variety in 
the world.  Since his work in the 1830s, Charles Darwin receives much of the credit for 
furthering a theory of biological evolution.  While not the first to have the idea, he associated 
observations of species variety on the island of Galapagos with species environment, and 
suggested that nature selected the variations that were the fittest (Darwin, 1859). In its time 
(and even since), the idea was considered radical and a threat to the religious and social order 
of things. Mere variety itself can be controversial, since, paradoxically, variety is appreciated in 
some domains (see the writings of William Cowper, 1731-1800)1 and abhorred in others (Neave, 
2000, March 2).2 At the core of the subject of evolutionary acquisition are ideas and phenomena 
about variety and change. As a policy for system development, it is controversial too. As with 
Darwinian concepts, product evolution involves information transfer, interaction with the 
environment and unpredictability of change outcomes. But unlike evolutionary biology, product 
variations and selections occur frequently and are non-random. Program managers typically 
seek stability—in program requirements, in funding, in system design, and in production 
configuration. But it seems the only constant is change. Everything changes and evolves over 
                                                
1 See also: Kerr (1979, p. 65) about the basic human need for variety and complexity. Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety states that the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as diverse as its 
environment in order to cope with the variety of challenges imposed by it (Ashby, 1960).  
2 “Variation is nasty: it makes things difficult, unpredictable, untrustworthy: bad quality.” “In a big way, bad 
quality means too much variation, good quality means little variation.” 
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time. Much of what the authors have found in their following research on spiral development and 
project management is about how managers must cope with product variety and change. Using 
case study analyses, review of current subject literature, and computational modeling, the focus 
of our research was to ascertain the acquisition management implications of spiral 
development, obtain lessons learned in past programs as applicable to future development 
efforts, model and simulate projects using different acquisition approaches, derive predictions 
and make recommendations to project managers for the effective and efficient harnessing and 
implementation of spiral development. 
Background 
Projects have long been defined as unique and temporary enterprises, as opposed to 
common and ongoing operations. The latest (2004) version of the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK) increased its emphasis upon the term “progressive elaboration” to 
describe a third fundamental characteristic of all projects. It means, “developing in steps and 
continuing by increments; worked out with care and detail; developed thoroughly” (PMBOK, 
2000; PMBOK, 2004, p. 6). This term relates to project uncertainty and describes the eventual 
realization of project scope only after multiple iterations of planning. The PMBOK asserts that 
progressive elaboration is both a necessary characteristic of projects (occurring throughout their 
lifecycles), as well as a technique for development of product specifications. It is accomplished 
via the learning that takes place over time as project ambiguity resolves, so that project scope 
becomes more explicit and detailed (as opposed to “requirements creep,” which is considered 
uncontrolled change). The PMBOK later asserts that change in the course of projects and 
products is inevitable, and mandates the need for a disciplined change-control process to 
control its impacts—from inception to completion (PMBOK, 2004, p. 119). 
There are many new DoD terms for project management and product development 
methods. DoD promulgated evolutionary acquisition (EA) as policy in 2000, and soon after, 
spiral development for the preferred acquisition strategy of all materiel. EA’s goal is to phase 
requirements and provide capability sooner. But there has been confusion over terms, despite 
further elaboration and even codification in statute, and it still persists today, along with a lack of 
full understanding of many policy implications—especially some inherent risks. EA operationally 
means there will always be multiple product releases of an item. 
The policy thrust is primarily about the reduction of product cycle-time within an 
uncertain environment, by exclusively using mature technology. The DoD’s requirements 
process has also followed with “evolutionary” requirements documents—a new idea. 
Uncertainty is the usual realm of program managers, especially in defense systems, and is 
usually dealt with by seeking best information. Earlier reform initiatives were aimed at 
overcoming information gaps and technology lag. The 1990’s Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) initiative was about gaining collective wisdom for early and complete 
requirements realization. As concerns over DoD acquisition program costs and cycle-times 
continue in the current mid-2000s era, the DoD has not abandoned the use of IPPD.  But by 
embracing evolutionary requirements and acquisition, it has acknowledged that information will 
never be complete, either from stakeholders or with regard to ever-changing technology. It now 
implicitly concedes that developers will learn about their design over time (“requirements 
realization”), and users will accretively gain knowledge about how they can better use the new 
  
                  Acquisition Research: creating synergy for informed change        - 487 - 
 
 
capability (“product discovery”).3 Thus, a major paradigm shift for product development has 
occurred in the DoD: from a collaborative quest to capture and address all requirements early 
on, to an allowance of eventual requirements discovery with full attainment only after 
visualization, feedback and environmental changes occur along the way.  
The Enabler: Mature Technology Reduces Risk  
This is not to say, however, that the DoD has in its policy embraced technological 
uncertainty for the commencement of advanced development. Quite the contrary—for at the 
very heart of the evolutionary acquisition strategy is the requirement for the exclusive use of 
mature technology to reduce technology risk. The impetus for this undoubtedly lies in the body 
of work by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) over the last ten years,4 which has 
obviously and greatly influenced the DoD 5000 series. The GAO encourages the use of 
knowledge-based processes and specifically separates technology development from product 
development. It argues that shorter product cycle-times are the hallmark of program success 
and, therefore, should be limited to five years for more frequent introduction of new technologies 
into weapon systems, speeding them to the warfighter. We note that this is not much longer 
than the average development time for a new model of automobile—typically 3-4 years—which 
occurs in a very mature and cyclical industry (Kim, 2002, June). The GAO’s target may ignore 
the significantly greater amount of technology development required in many DoD projects 
compared with most automobile development projects. 
Most emphasized by the GAO (in the many reports reviewed by these authors) is the 
aspect of technology maturity before commencement of advanced development. The Office 
applies a 1-through-9 rating scale of technology readiness levels (TRL) that was developed by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, adopted by Army and Air Force research 
laboratories, and recently implemented in the DoD 5000 series (in particular, the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook—formerly DoD 5000.2R). Until recently, the DoD had no specific 
requirements for use of TRLs, but levels 6 and 7 now satisfy its guidelines for technology 
maturity at Milestone B. TRL 6 states that the technology has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment (simulating the key aspects of the operational environment), and TRL 7 is its 
demonstration in an operational environment (that which addresses all operational requirements 
and specifications required of the final system, to include platform/packaging). The GAO clearly 
prefers TRL 7 as the level of technology maturity that will represent a low and satisfactory risk 
for starting product development (GAO, 2005, November 15). The Office acknowledges that 
users may not initially receive the ultimate capability under this approach, but that the initial 
capability will arrive predictably sooner and cheaper (GAO, 2005, November 15). 
In some respects, developing only mature technology as a fundamental program 
requirement is similar to an earlier attempt to constrain project scope. Cost as an Independent 
                                                
3 The authors’ terminology for what has so often been observed from their experiences. Most of us have 
long known that full realization of requirements and visualization of the product often takes multiple 
iterations of design, with feedback loops from modeling and testing activities.  And sometimes the 
customer doesn’t fully realize what can be done with the product until it is in hand. We call that product 
discovery, and the authors can cite several examples of this in both commercial and defense applications 
(i.e., cell phones as improvised explosive device triggers, etc.). 
4 See in particular: GAO/NSIAD-98-56; GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123; GAO/NSIAD-99-162; GAO/T-NSIAD-99-
116; GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137; GAO-01-288; GAO-02-701; GAO-03-57; GAO-04-53. 
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Variable (CAIV) was an acquisition reform initiative that emerged in 1995 as a means of trading 
scope, or system performance, to achieve cost objectives. It was one of very few initiatives that 
were oriented on what, not how (i.e., processes) the DoD acquires its materiel.5 To date, its 
actual savings benefit has been difficult to quantify, and qualitative measures have shown mixed 
results (RAND, 2005). Requirement attainment objectives and thresholds were another way to 
facilitate performance trades for cost. 
When fully realized, it is the exclusive use of mature technology in system development 
programs that is the key enabler of evolutionary acquisition strategy, facilitating the rapid 
transformation of applied technology to end-item capability. Thus, it is the third of three principal 
observations, all of which are paradigm shifts, that we have recently observed: (1) that the DoD 
would now mandate program strategies for all programs to have multiple product releases of the 
same item, (2) that requirements would be deferred or allowed to evolve over time, and (3) that 
high levels of technological maturity would be requisite for commencement of advanced 
development, with an intended reduction of technical risk (and thus, project schedule) 
(USD(AT&L), 2003a, May 12, Enclosure—Additional Policy E1.14). 
Policy and Implementation Concerns 
But there are questions and concerns about these major shifts that several authors have 
raised. Still a relatively new policy, observations and realizations about the outcomes of 
evolutionary acquisition and spiral development are only just beginning to emerge, and will 
continue to surface until at least several major programs go through their entire lifecycle in this 
way. Sylvester and Ferrera (2003) provided some insight into the challenges and obstacles of 
evolutionary acquisition implementation—not from program-office level—but from the 
perspective of strategic policy-makers and subscribers at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD)-level during their struggle to adopt the policy. In short, the authors explained the 
aforementioned confusion and ambiguity of the policy as it evolved from 1983 toward final 
promulgation in 2000, and then described the conflict areas caused by shifts in power among 
the organizational fiefdoms in the OSD and other affected institutions (i.e., Congress and the 
defense industry). In particular, they exposed the following major stakeholder communities and 
their respective areas of concern about evolutionary acquisition: 
 Congress—loss of control over DoD programs via specific and informed authorization 
and approval; the inability to keep the DoD accountable; unknown implications of 
requirements and budget flexibility required for evolutionary acquisition. 
 Military Departments—need to protect own acquisition programs and share of the DoD 
budget; retention of funding for follow-on capability increments; increased oversight; 
downstream logistics of multi-configuration products. 
 Defense Industry—disruptions to commercial processes and traditional approaches to 
business; competition for follow-on increments; lower-rate production runs after shorter 
R&D efforts. 
                                                
5 Some may also assert that the moratorium against MILSPECS was similar in its thrust to reduce 
unnecessary work scope, but we believe specifications to be as much prescriptive (i.e., “how”) as they are 
descriptive.  
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 Comptroller—controlling programs and holding them accountable; unknown implications 
of requirements and budget flexibility required for EA (program and budget “gaming” by 
services); “full funding” policy6 versus open-ended requirements and fund streams. 
 Requirements/Users—sub-optimum capability; priority of what is needed versus what is 
currently attainable; loss of follow-on increments.  
 Test and Evaluation—loss of discipline and assurance of operational effectiveness & 
suitability; lack of comprehensive testing before several low-rate production 
configurations are released. 
We have also had tactical (implementation) concerns about excessive decision 
bureaucracy (number of DAB reviews—see Figure 1), organizational challenges from multiple 
and concurrent development efforts, outdated technology at release, funds forecasting, 
transaction costs, and maintenance of subsequent increment priority. It is these phenomena 
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Figure 1. Comparison of 1996 and 2003 Acquisition Framework Models 
 
                                                
6 The authors explain the dual meanings of this term later in this discussion. 
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The Costs and Benefits of Variety—and the Need for Control 
Evolutionary acquisition methodologies, in addition to potentially adding more 
concurrency during development, increase variety in production. Both concurrency and variety 
are elements of complexity and program risk. Variety adds complexity in production and is 
costly for hardware owners and manufacturers alike. Traditional views about late design 
changes are negative, except for producibility enhancements and savings or correction of 
design flaws. But market consumers often need items in rapid cycle-times and appreciate 
product differentiation. In support of EA policy, the GAO has used product examples such as 
commercial vehicles. For the most part, we regard these commercial products as relatively “low-
tech” on a comparative scale of DoD system complexity and capability.  Moreover, we feel the 
GAO may ignore some very important aspects of ownership, since the DoD is unique as an 
outsourcer of capitol projects for internal use, and has unique requirements against competitive 
threats in combat environments.  
Control measures are used to manage risk. One way of coping with the complexities of 
variety in ownership is via organizational and individual accountability. A recent example of 
successful control of rapid change lies in the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion/Advanced 
Processing Build (A-RCI/PB) program. In this vital program for sustainment of submarine 
acoustic sensing superiority, a series of hardware and software upgrades were planned and 
executed in rapid succession. Each emerged with advancement in capability, keeping pace with 
technology and competitive threats, facilitated by rigorous control of interfaces, standards and 
protocols (Boudreau, 2006). 
Many other useful theorems on systems complexity, change and control exist that may 
be helpful for practitioners to consider, but are beyond the general scope of our research.  
Do Product Attributes Affect Spiral Applicability and Outcomes? 
Spiral development as a universal, “one-size-fits-all” strategy may not always be 
appropriate.  Perhaps the foremost reservation is the appropriateness of the spiral development 
process for all project sizes and product commodities in toto, and the application of the spiral 
process to hardware products versus Boehm’s original and most relevant application of this 
development approach toward software.7 We speculate whether certain product characteristics 
might determine spiral development method applicability, and, thus, may offer important 
considerations for project planners.  
 Mutability simplifies change, and spiral development was conceived for the most 
malleable of products: “soft” ware, which is virtually costless in production. Multiple 
product increments do not often appear in large, static, singular projects such as 
bridges, highways, skyscrapers, or in other project areas that have typically long lead 
times or product cycles, such as feature-length films, pharmaceuticals, etc. These are 
what we call nearly immutable products and are much different than smaller projects 
(like small application software development) with much shorter development periods.  
                                                
7 And the authors will be quick to acknowledge that software is indeed a huge and growing part of 
hardware systems large and small. Still, the spiral development framework in current literature applies 
overwhelmingly to the realm of software, not hardware. 
  
                  Acquisition Research: creating synergy for informed change        - 491 - 
 
 
 Cycle-time and Phase Concurrency. Akin to relatively mutable or immutable products, 
we have observed the successive product upgrades visible in long-running aircraft 
programs (UH-60 Blackhawk and C-130 Hercules as examples) in which there are 
periods of production configuration stability, followed by improvement efforts, followed by 
another stable use period. Cycle-time for the development of each increment, and the 
relatively successive or concurrent phasing of the follow-on increments, will have a 
definite impact on program structure, budgeting, project complexity, and organizational 
issues, etc. For reasons that we will bring forth in our section on the computational 
modeling of spiral development, we have concerns about the conceptualization of spiral 
development programs with continuous and highly concurrent phasing of development 
increments. We suggest that, though concurrency is a necessary ingredient for efficient 
project management, it has also long been correlated with risk (because of activity 
interdependency), and might vary significantly with the types of activities underway (See 
Figure 2)—the inference being that periods of stable production configuration between 
development increments reduce complexity in program structure and attendant risks. 
Similarly, shorter cycle-times have less opportunity for knock-on effects or secondary 
consequences. Particularly in matrix organization structures, as often the case with 
projects, there can be a tendency to staff multiple projects with a single specialist. The 
more projects a specialist supports, the less they are proportionately available to the 
projects due to “queuing inefficiencies.”Availability decreases because of the need 
for transition between projects (physical, mental, learning curve, etc.).  
 The end result has sometimes been shown to be large delays in project completion 
(Smith & Reinhartsen, 1998).  
 Similarly, Ibrahim (2005) has shown that discontinuous enterprise membership is a 
contributing factor toward knowledge loss in organizations involved in large, complex 
product development processes. Examining knowledge flows across product 
lifecycles, members often are not engaged in all phases. Whether from rotation of 
duties or multi-tasking, a discontinuous member’s inaccurate knowledge could cause 
a functional error at the individual level which is not obvious at the enterprise’s 
overall project level. These findings support observations of knowledge loss 
continuing despite investments in information technology and knowledge 
management. 
  




Figure 2. Concurrency Relative to Types of Activity 
 User Risk (Safety and Time Criticality). Time criticality and life-saving dependency, as 
opposed to user hazard levels (safety & man-rating), might seem to also have influence 
over design approaches. We have discussed above the area of technological risk and 
the DoD’s use of incremental or spiral approaches to resolve it (along with a compulsory 
policy for the advanced development of only relatively mature technology). But DoD 
products have expanded risk considerations beyond Boehm’s models of commercial 
software. Extending the idea of project risk-as-a-driver down to the level of the end-user, 
it might seem logical to assume that time criticality of the need or mission, where risk of 
not achieving project success actually endangers customer lives, might be a significant 
factor in the appropriate application of the spiral process for reduced initial product cycle-
time. Perhaps defensive systems are a good example. The immediate needs for a 
Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) defeater or an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
neutralizer for currently deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, clearly 
dictate that lives will be lost if a near-term capability is not achieved. We also cite as an 
example the National Missile Defense (NMD) initiative, in which, in view of near-term 
threats, early deployment of even rudimentary capability has been deemed preferable to 
waiting for full capability. Such urgency likely precludes full and certain requirements 
specificity. 
 Non-man-rated Systems: In an almost opposite vein, non-man-rated systems, such 
as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or cave-exploring robots—capabilities in which 
operator lives are not at risk if the product fails—may also lend themselves readily to 
rapid innovation and risk-less experimentation cycles. However, user hazard levels 
for man-rated systems may be a different matter.  
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 Man-rated Systems: Configuration variety adds technical complexity with 
unpredictable interactions. In such projects as pharmaceuticals, aviation, vehicular 
transportation, etc., producers mitigate safety risks with thorough analyses, 
documentation reviews, testing and other control and verification processes.  By their 
very nature—with lethal hazards for the end-user, and typically lengthy approval 
requirements—these may not be good candidates for a spiral approach. We believe 
this is why space experts say they’ll not use spiral development with NASA’s new 
Crew Exploration Vehicle (Roy, 2006).  
 Production Quantity. As to product size or production quantity, we find no evidence that 
either precludes use of spiral—as with space vehicles and large ships—though support 
considerations do arise with variety that could greatly affect total costs of ownership.  
 Logistical Support planned during Service/Shelf Life. Our observations warn that multiple 
configurations of hardware products do come at a cost for ownership. Veterans of new 
system deployments across the force/fleet, or throughout any large using organization, 
know the difficulties of rolling out a configuration change. Benefits of standardization 
have long been offered via production economies of scale, commonality of parts across 
platforms, and interoperability. If the ultimate goal is to have standardization across the 
DoD’s force, owning multiple configurations of a system (variety) equates to added 
complexity in training and supply support of the item. Neither can the logistical 
maintenance strategy be ignored: whether the end-item is maintenance-intensive (such 
as tactical vehicles) or maintenance-free—such as with many electronics items and 
munitions, and situations in which physical changes are completely transparent to the 
user. For multiple product configurations, the answer could have a huge effect on the 
total costs of ownership, as shown by RAND on the proliferation of UAVs (Shaver & 
Amouzegar, 2005).  
 Range of Requirement Attainment. Certain requirements are binary rather than 
continuous. Examples are soft launch, network security, physical fit, leak-proof, 
shock/vibration/drop proof, survivability, horizontal-to-vertical flight transition, etc. If one 
of these more binary-type requirements happens to be a key performance parameter, its 
attainment will be on the project’s critical path and highly dependent upon technical 
maturity. As such, it may practically dictate the length of the entire advanced 
development effort and make division into capability increments less beneficial as a 
development strategy.  
 Amount of Change—and the Lure of Modularity. These authors subscribe to the current 
theorists’ view that system complexity is comprised of numbers (of components), 
connections (interdependencies) and distinctions (variety). Distinction corresponds to 
variety, to heterogeneity, and to the fact that different parts of complex systems behave 
differently (Heylighen, 1997). Variety is a component of Nobel Prize winner Herbert 
Simon’s explanation of complexity—many different parts with many interactions. Simon 
argues, from his observation of complexity in things both natural and artificial, that 
complex systems evolve from simple systems. And they do so more rapidly when there 
are stable, intermediate forms or sub-systems (like modules or “units of action”) (Simon, 
1981). While the concept of modularity suggests approximately independent subsystems 
may be modified or adapted as such, it has been shown that, in the aggregate, there is 
yet quantifiable modular interdependency that affects evolvability (Watson & Pollack, 
2005). In other words, how changes in the state of one module affect the state of 
another is relative and measurable. Thus, we suggest it is not only the focus upon 
structural modularity as such, and, standard interfaces, that enable systems evolution. 
Rather, it is the relative interdependency of the modules. In short, PMs need to be 
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mindful of the degree of change in subsequent spirals. One subsystem is likely to affect 
another in the short- or long-run. And that can make product evolution problematic. As 
Norman Augustine once said, “No change is a small change”; independent subsystems, 
even redundant ones, aren’t always independent (Augustine, 1997, June). 
 Development Case Studies 
One of the most recent monographs we have found on emerging results of evolutionary 
acquisition is by RAND—on five immature, non-man-rated space systems. Space systems are 
somewhat different (in quantities, space environment, front-end investment, and extended 
technology development periods) than other DoD sytsems. RAND also found that policy 
confusion persists, and that EA added program complexity and uncertainty, especially with 
regard to budgeting. Extending their findings to non-space DoD programs, RAND highlighted 
the EA challenges of programmatic flux. They feel, and we agree, that EA presents the 
opportunity for typical PM challenges to be even more formidable.  
Two missile programs were used as case studies for analysis and to illustrate planned 
and unplanned change. ATACMS used incremental and spiral strategies for product 
development. The program skipped its technology development phase by employing mature 
technologies for a leap-ahead capability in range. It arrived on budget and schedule, with 
several successive variants, pre-planned and unplanned. One instance of production change 
caused missile failure and costly refit of already produced missiles—underscoring the need for 
more thorough design specification and configuration management accountability.  
Javelin used the single-step-to-full-capability approach to product development. The 
program embarked upon advanced development with immature technologies in several critical 
areas, causing significant cost and schedule overruns. It also has had subsequent design 
changes and product variety, more so as running production changes than as product variants.  
Synthesis of these cases conveys that as an approach oriented primarily for reduction of 
product cycle-time, incremental or spiral development can successfully be used when 
developing mature technologies first. But a system’s physical properties like mutability, along 
with other factors such as time criticality (user risk) and modular interdependency, will drive 
spiral development applicability. And key capabilities may in fact depend upon the least mature 
technologies or even binary requirements. An “open,” or at least elegant, architecture is key to 
forming a basis for independent modular variety; and thorough design specification and 
configuration management accountability is essential for managing the complexity of multiple 
product releases. All amorphous spirals eventually become defined increments. Other well-
known programs have used a spiral approach over their long product life spans, but often have 
successive phasing of their development increments.  
Computational Modeling of Spiral Development 
A computational experimentation approach to investigating evolutionary acquisition 
projects is explored below. This approach integrates theory and practice in a computational tool 
that allows controlled experimentation through simulation. The current work reflects project 
theory (e.g., the theory of constraints and work flows), product development theory (e.g., rework 
impacts and work dependencies), and management (e.g., resource management and 
information theory). Practice is reflected in the model through the use of case studies to build 
and validate the model structures (as described in the literature cited) and the calibration and 
testing using the acquisition projects described above. A computational experimentation 
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approach provides many advantages over pure and benefits from several of the strengths of 
both laboratory and field research. Nissen and Buettner (2004) describe and discuss the 
computational experimentation approach, and Dillard and Nissen (2007) describe its application 
to investigating acquisition projects.  
The system dynamics methodology was applied. System dynamics uses a 
computational experimentation approach to understanding and improving dynamically complex 
systems. The system dynamics perspective focuses on the roles of accumulations and flows, 
feedback, and nonlinear relationships in managerial control. The methodology’s ability to model 
many diverse system components (e.g., work, people, money), processes (e.g., design, 
technology development, quality assurance), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., 
forecasting, resource allocation) make it useful for investigating acquisition projects. Forrester 
(1961) develops the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling 
process with examples and describes numerous applications. 
Modeling Incremental Development with Multiple Development 
Blocks 
Figure 3 depicts an acquisition project with multiple increments or blocks. Subsequent 
blocks have the same basic information flow, but can also be delayed by the completion of 
phases in previous blocks or constrained by the progress in their own blocks. Importantly, in 
addition to the flow of information downstream through phases (black arrows in Figure 3), 
multiple iteration acquisition also provides opportunities for information to flow upstream, such 
as from User Product Testing in an earlier iteration to Develop Requirements or Advanced 
Development in a subsequent iteration (red vertical arrows in Figure 3).  






Milestones, Iter #1 A1 B1 DRR1 C1 FRP1
Milestones, Iter #2 A2 B2 DRR2 C2 FRP2
Milestones, Iter #3 A3 B3 DRR3 C3 FRP3
Time Periods 
 
Figure 3. Information Flows in an Incremental Acquisition Project 
In the model, the structure of each block is the same, although parameter values are 
varied to reflect different acquisition projects and strategies. For example, all phases include 
start-up work that is not directly applied to generating development products (requirements, 
technologies, component designs, or products). Each phase also includes the requisite review 
work that also does not directly generate product. This is consistent with GAO 
recommendations to manage each development block like an individual project. One impact of 
this loading of each phase with start-up and review work that we suspect has only been 
recognized informally is a significant increase in the total amount of work required to provide a 
given set of requirements to warfighters when multiple development blocks are used. As was 
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shown with our modeling results, this work has a significant impact on project performance that 
may impact the types of projects in which spiral development can be effective.   
Computational modeling of incremental/spiral versus a single-step methodology yields 
results that illustrate our implementation concerns. Spiral development can provide the initial 
increment delivery with some (but not all) requirements satisfied earlier than in single-block 
development. However, spiral development takes more time and costs more to satisfy all 
requirements than single-block development. Spiral development has a high risk of not 
satisfying all requirements by the time single-block development can satisfy all requirements 











Table 1. Performance Comparison of Three Simulated Acquisition Projects 
The causal paths that drive and constrain project performance in spiral development 
pass through multiple types of resources, development processes, and move across both 
development phases and development blocks. They also vary widely for different performance 
measures. This makes the drivers of and constraints on spiral acquisition project performance 
more difficult to identify than those in single-block development projects. Our modeling results 
indicate that spiral development is a significantly different approach to acquisition than single-
block development, and requires different planning, resourcing, and management.  
The concurrent use of multiple development blocks in spiral development significantly 
increases the number of development phases and activities that must be managed and 
coordinated at any given time compared to single-block development. This increases the project 
management needs for successful acquisition in spiral development projects compared to 
single-block projects.  
As in single-block development, progress in spiral development requires the 
identification and understanding of progress bottlenecks. The concurrence and resulting 
complexity of development in spiral projects causes the types and locations of bottlenecks to 
vary widely and be more difficult to identify and address than in single-block development. 
Units of 
Measure Javelin
Base Case - 
traditional
Base Case - 
spiral
Duration to first 
requirement satisfied weeks 471 470 397
Duration to max. 
requirements satisfied weeks 520 518 762
Total development cost $1,000,000 722 719 1,555
Requirements satisfied 
by deadline % 100 91 18
Final requirements 
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Causal paths of the drivers and constraints on project performance and progress 
bottlenecks move from one feature of a project to another as projects evolve. The increased 
dynamics of development in spiral development projects, as compared to single-block 
development, make identifying and addressing causal paths and progress bottlenecks more 
difficult. Progress bottlenecks can cause counterintuitive behavior, such as reductions in project 
cost, by adding resources at a bottleneck. Understanding and exploiting the opportunities 
provided by these behaviors requires a deep understanding of the project structures and 
dynamic interactions that drive and constrain progress. 
Discussion—Recent Views on Balancing Risk and Control 
Boehm’s latest book on software development advocates balancing disciplined and agile 
methods to capitalize on the benefits of both. Discipline is needed as a control mechanism to 
avoid risk, but agility is needed to respond quickly to customer needs. Saying, “One size fits all 
is a myth”; he advocates a balanced approach based upon risk. He also advocates the more 
disciplined, risk-averse approaches for projects that are mission/safety critical, larger in size, 
and have more stable requirements (Boehm, 2004).  
It could be summarized that spiral development was at its inception and is at its 
extension all about risk. Paradoxically, it is an agile method envisioned to reduce risk and, yet, 
can potentially add its own. On the one hand, a spiral or incremental approach allays risk by 
reducing scope to render only the highest priority capabilities with the exclusive use of mature 
technology, and obtains early and continuous feedback from the environment for follow-on 
developments. On the other hand, it introduces concurrency during advanced development and 
adds variety in production, with all their attendant management challenges.  
Observations and Assessments 
Although today’s policy of evolutionary acquisition is prescribed as a development 
methodology, it is actually focused more upon what—not how—we develop. As such, it is about 
doable scope, reducing risk via exclusive use of mature technology.  The Cost As an 
Independent Variable and other requirement-limiting initiatives were earlier attempts to 
accomplish this, by encouraging product performance trades to keep cost estimates fixed. As 
with CAIV, this likely means trading performance requirements for earliest-deploying 
increments. 
Spiral development also seeks to spread out the technical risk over more development 
and process time via incrementing. We have shown with simulation that this can potentially 
improve risk management performance initially, but with higher overall costs and longer 
subsequent development durations, if deliberately deferring known, estimable work.  As such, 
our computational modeling indicates that incremental development costs more and requires 
more time to provide the same requirements than single-step development. With regard to 
project risk, the increased complexity in a project using an incremental or spiral approach 
makes the isolation and effective management of progress bottlenecks more difficult than in 
single-step development. 
The policy change is that spiral development now includes undefinitized increments and 
prescribes incremental development instead of single step development. All amorphous spirals 
will eventually become defined increments—mini-programs. In years past, they have often been 
implemented as sequential, separate, and successive product upgrades (such as the CH-47, 
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UH-60, C-130, B-52 program examples). But current policy expresses these as more 
concurrent, frequent and continuous. Such concurrency adds complexity to development 
models, with attendant risks of over allocation of work, noise, error, duplication, and other 
inefficiencies from work deferral and divided effort in project management organizations. 
Additional oversight, reviews, contracting, testing, etc., will also likely affect transaction costs. If 
all requirements are known and an incremental approach is used, then there is a deliberate 
deferral of work to later increments, and there will be a resultant increase in total development 
costs and durations for these same reasons. 
Recommendations for Practice 
1. Project managers need to be aware of the inherent risks of spiral development and take 
necessary precautions to balance those risks. Many tools and control measures are 
currently developed and available to assist project managers in balancing the risks of 
spiral development, such as technology readiness levels, configuration management, 
technology performance management, real options, project phasing, risk management, 
earned value management and organizational design. 
2. Incremental and spiral development projects provide additional opportunities for 
managing development risk in the project design. These include project-planning 
decisions about the number of development blocks, the requirements and associated 
technologies and design components to be included in specific blocks. This planning 
provides opportunities to anticipate where critical progress bottlenecks may occur and 
design how to best monitor potential bottlenecks and respond to them.  
3. Product attributes may help determine the suitability of spiral development as the best 
methodology. PMs may wish to consider such characteristics as: mutability, time 
criticality, man-rating, modular interdependency, key parameters of capability versus 
range of requirement attainment (i.e., binary vs continuous), and the relative amount of 
concurrency among increments.  
4. Progress bottlenecks in iterative and spiral development often oscillate between process 
constraints (e.g., availability of work due to upstream progress) and resource constraints 
(developer or project management quantities or productivities). Successfully addressing 
a constraining progress bottleneck often shifts the limit on progress to a different location 
in the project. Therefore, a structured and interdisciplinary practice of identifying and 
addressing bottlenecks can improve performance.  
5. Configuration management accountability must be assigned or kept to maintain 
supportability and failure-mode identification and causality and prevent the variety 
generated by spiral development from reducing total product performance. 
Conclusions 
We’ve suggested that a one-size-fits-all methodology for DoD system development may 
not be appropriate, and have offered for consideration several product attributes that might help 
determine the efficacy of the spiral approach. We further suggest that spiral development may 
serve better than single-step development for initial capability when products are mutable, time-
critical, non-maintenance intensive, and have continuous (vs. binary) or uncertain requirements, 
short cycle-times (less knock-on effects), sequentially phased development, and modular 
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independence. In contrast, spiral development may not be appropriate when there are safety or 
man-rating concerns and have attributes opposite to those above.  In particular, PMs should 
understand the nature of their product requirements with regard to their range of attainment and 
relative to key parameters of capability, and vis-à-vis the readiness level of their enabling 
technologies. Some key features may indeed be binary, and others may have significant 
ramifications of partial attainment—such as propagated change across the entire product 
componentry (as in weight reduction), versus a more independent, modular modification. 
Open design standards will not always be incorporable. And product variety will emerge, 
with and without backward compatibility, interoperability, etc. Variety is both an asset (for end-
users) and a liability (for manufacturers, owners and supporters). As such, to compensate for 
product variety, “owners” must “own” the design and emphasize configuration management, 
keeping or assigning responsibility for that function, and maintaining accountability for it. 
Both product specifications as well as risk realization in spiral development move from 
being amorphous to defined. Spiral development has inherent challenges, both strategic and 
tactical, of which PMs must be aware. We’ve highlighted and illustrated them here, as well as 
showing (in our case studies) that spiral development can indeed work—especially for 
technically mature and mutable products with open or elegant architecture. Program Managers 
must be aware of these inherent risks, and take necessary precautions to balance them with 
increased use of tools, such as technology readiness levels, configuration management, 
technical performance measurement, contract incentives, options and phasing, organizational 
design, etc.  
Stability is the quest in all things programmatic—for funding, requirements, design, 
configuration, etc. But in an unstable world, and with the future being necessarily uncertain, the 
tension between control and change is probably unending. PMs do have some tools for coping, 
and being forewarned is being forearmed. PMs are used to concurrency and change, as they 
are largely what make project management what it is—a balancing act. Mechanisms for control 
of risk include project management tools such as configuration management, technical 
performance measurement, earned value management, risk management, etc. Organizational 
and cultural factors such as leadership, trust and accountability play a significant role as well. 
Successful use of these tools to balance control and risk in projects with a high rate of change 
and concurrency is an area for our further study. 
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